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COMMENT ON "THE CRIMINAL LAW AS
A THREAT SYSTEM"
JOHN BRAITHWAITE
There are two very fundamental agreements between van den
Haag's paper and mine: (1) "From the viewpoint of just deserts, the
coordination of crimes and punishments . . . is . . . unavoidably arbitrary"; and (2) there is therefore little choice but to fall back onto utilitarian rationales.
Nevertheless, van den Haag's utilitarian regress is a myopic commitment to deterrence and a total rejection of other utilitarian goals of
punishment. I do not want to quibble with van den Haag's demolition
of rehabilitation and incapacitation, even though the arguments are
often overstated, because essentially he is right about the enormous
problems with these doctrines.
But why has deterrence been spared the same critical eye? We are
told that "Deterrence is a matter of immediate observation (common
sense)" and that the failure of social scientists to demonstrate the actuality of deterrence is not reason enough to stop trying to deter crime. Why
not extend the same charity to rehabilitation? Just as we apply the
"common sense" of deterrence to everyday activities like raising our
children, so we apply the "common sense" of rehabilitation through reasoning, shaming, moralizing, etc.
The most unconvincing part of van den Haag's argument is his suggestion that the replacement .of desert by deterrence as the yardstick of
punishment in a sense can be justified retributively. Deterrence is conceived as a proxy for desert. The assumption is that what retributivists
believe to be deserved for most punishments is very similar to what society believes necessary for deterrence. Empirical work is needed to test
this assumption.'
However, the deep problems with van den Haag's use of deterrence
as a proxy for desert are logical rather than empirical. The use of
1 This empirical work could consist of (a) interviewing various retributivists about what
punishments they would impose for a list of crimes on retributive grounds, (b) interviewing
sample members of society on the punishments necessary to deter the same list of crimes, and
(c) correlating the two sets of scores.
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surveys to establish community consensus over deserved punishments is
rejected because "For the retributionist the moral question-what is
justly deserved?-cannot be decided by what people believe [to be deserved]." But the alternative on which he ultimately settles suffers exactly the same defect of dependence on public opinion (this time of
needed deterrence) rather than on "real" desert. The yardstick of punishment is to be the "socially demanded degree of deterrence": "[T]he
social demand for deterrence can be quantified: it is equal to the frequency of any crime society is willing to tolerate rather than to increase
the size of punishment or other costs." How can we quanitify what society is willing to tolerate other than by asking its individual members?
Van den Haag leaves us with a method of operationalizing desert which
continues to jettison what is right in favor of what people believe to be
right.
There are other problems with using "the frequency of any crime
society is willing to tolerate" as the yardstick for punishment. First, it
assumes that "society" understands how increases in punishment reduce
the frequency of crime. Having earlier conceded that social scientists do
not understand this connection, we are now asked to believe that "society" does. Second, might "society" be just as happy to achieve its "social demand for deterrence" by increasing police forces or by other
means which change the certainty of apprehension rather than the severity of punishment?
Van den Haag might reply that in assessing the social demand for
deterrence we can only take account of the existing level of apprehension. But this implies that the punishment in a jurisdiction with an understaffed and incompetent police force must be higher for the same
crime than in a neighboring jurisdiction with an efficient force. The
regress to utilitarianism is more total than van den Haag pretends. We
cannot claim to be punishing people according to their deserts when
what they get depends on how many other people have been apprehended for the same offense. Van den Haag's mandatory sentences may
escape the injustice of individual judges imposing exemplary sentences
for the sake of deterrence, but it opens up the more profound structural
injustice of whole categories of crime being punished above the deserved
level because of low apprehension rates for that category.
The utilitarian impurity of some people bearing a heavier punishment to make up for the unpunished sins of others is not the only difficulty. Consider the elasticity of behavior to deterrent threats. It is
widely assumed, with some data to support the assumption, that while
many common crimes, especially crimes of passion, are perpetrated by
irrational actors, white-collar criminals are highly rational and calculat-
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ing and therefore more susceptible to deterrent threats.2 The problem
in controlling most white-collar crime is not that the offenders are short
on fear of punishment but that getting courts to convict them is so difficult. But in those areas where frequent punishment of white-collar
criminals can be achieved, and there are some, 3 is the retributivist willing to accept the imposition of sentences much lower than those "deserved" because the actions involved are so sensitive to stigma and
deterrence? At the other extreme, are retributivists happy to punish domestic assailants more than they deserve because their type of criminality is so impassioned and impervious to deterrence? In short, by
operationalizing desert through the social demand for deterrence, van
den Haag happily shoulders most of the terrible moral problems that
come with preferring the utilitarian path to the retributivist one.
Van den Haag is a punitive closest utilitarian. He believes in maximizing deterrence by sentences which are mandated, determinate and
flat ("punishment is the more deterrent the more automatic it is."). In
arguing that determinate sentencing will reduce crime and do justice to
future victims, van den Haag constantly forgets the problematic nature
of the enormous body of relevant empirical evidence. 4 Is it not possible
that the Japanese model of criminal justice,5 based on the desirability of
uncertainty, on giving offenders a second and a third chance, on keeping
people out of prison, 6 will prove more effective in protecting victims
than the American preoccupation with predictability? A lot of us in the
rest of the world are wondering if the results of the Japanese system
7
show that it is a superior model for crime control.
The arguments in my paper that mandatory punishment breeds
injustice are as applicable to those who favor mandatory and certain
punishment for utilitarian reasons as they are to those who do so on
retributive grounds. I have argued that certain punishment of white2 Evidence on the deterrability of white-collar crime is discussed in Braithwaite & Geis,

On Theog andActionfor CorporateCrime Control, 28 CRIME & DELINQ. (forthcoming issue, 1982).
3 Examples are the enforcement of safety or pollution violations in heavily regulated
industries which are subjected to intensive inspection (e.g., coal mining, nuclear power,
pharmaceuticals).
4 See references cited in Braithwaite, Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar
Crinuzals, 73 J. CRIM. L. & C. 723 n.1 (1982).
5 W. CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN JAPAN (1976): E. VOGEL, JAPAN As NUMBER ONE:

LESSONS FOR AMERICA 204-24 (1979).

6 The Japanese imprisonment rate is less than a fifth of that of the United States. As of
October 1, 1981, it was 44.3 per 100,000 of population. D. BILES & M. JOHNSON, PRISON
STATISTICS FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, Q. SUMMARY No. 7 (1982).
7 For a Japanese critic, the most objectionable aspect of van den Haag's paper would be
its total rejection of any social model ofman. Could it be that a large part ofJapanese success
(not only in crime control) is explicable in terms of the culture's refusal to build policies on
the assumption that man is an isolated individual responding rationally to rewards and
punishments?
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collar criminals is neither r~motely attainable nor desirable. It has been
shown how any pretense at moving towards certain punishment could
increase suffering from white-collar crime. Others have argued, for
quite different reasons, that certain punishment of common crime would
not reduce it but only succeed in victimizing taxpayers." And of course
if van den Haag and his followers push for certain punishment on both
fronts they will achieve substantial success in the slums while firing
blanks in the boardrooms. Under the banner of fixed justice, American
taxpayers will have spent a fortune on creating an even more unjust
society.
Van den Haag's final sentence makes the following extravagant
claim: "Deterrence theory is found to offer a basis for mandated, just,
equal, and optimally deterrent sentences." Mandated sentences are not
necessarily just, as in the case of a mandatory sentence being imposed on
a person who is not entirely blameworthy, or in the case where the law
was broken to achieve a higher social purpose (e.g., dangerous driving to
get an injured person to the hospital), or where there are some other
justly mitigating circumstances. Moreover, in my contributions to this
exchange, it has been argued that just punishments are not necessarily
equal, equal punishments are not necessarily optimally deterrent, and
optimally deterrent punishments are not necessarily just. The world is
too complicated for any unitary approach to punishment to make sense.

8 See references cited in D. BEYLEVELD, A BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GENERAL DETERRENCE 240 (1980) and in Biles, Crime and Impisonment: An Australian Time Sedrs Ana'l, 15 AuSTL. &
N.Z.J. CRIMNoLOGY (forthcoming issue, 1982).

